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Memento and the Haussmannization of Memory 
 
David B. Clarke 
 
No matter how different the reasons may be, the result is always the same; the 
scandalous alleys and lanes disappear to the accompaniment of lavish self-praise from 
the bourgeoisie on account of this tremendous success, but they appear again 
immediately somewhere else. … The same economic necessity which produced them in 
the first place, produces them in the next place also. 
ENGELS (1935 [1872], 74–7) 
 
Everything happens as if the impasses inherent in the original situation moved to 
another point in the mythic network, as if what was not resolved here always turned up 
over there. 
LACAN (1979 [1953], 415) 
 
‘Now where was I?’ 
Leonard Shelby (Guy Pearce) in Memento (dir. Christopher Nolan, 2000) 
 
Being-elsewhere – or, existence as alibi 
A map in a film prompts every spectator to consider bilocation. 
CONLEY (2007, 3) 
 
GEORGES FRANJU: Movies should have a beginning, a middle and an end. 





A brief episode from Freud’s Notes Upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis – the Rat Man 
case-history
2
 – can serve as a kind of establishing shot, anticipating something of what is to 
come: for what follows can only be understood backwards, yet must be read forwards (CALLE 




The episode in question concerns the Rat Man and his lover: 
 
On the day of her departure he knocked his foot against a stone lying in the road, and 
was obliged to put it out of the way by the side of the road, because the idea struck him 
that her carriage would be driving along the same road in a few hours’ time and might 
come to grief against this stone. But a few minutes later it occurred to him that this was 
absurd, and he was obliged to go back and replace the stone in its original position in 
the middle of the road. (FREUD S.E. X, 190) 
 
‘The theory of the unconscious means you can never get the stone in the right place,’ says 
EASTHOPE (1999, 170). In ZUPANČIČ’s (2013, 25) more formal statement of much the same 
idea: ‘the unconscious is not a subjective distortion of the objective world, it is first and 
foremost an indication of a fundamental inconsistency of the objective world itself, which … 
allows for and generates its own (subjective) distortions.’ The problem lies with the territory, 
not the map – or, perhaps, with the relation between the two. 
 
The impossibility of getting the stone in the right place has far wider bearing than on cases of 
obsessional neurosis alone or even in relation to the unconscious more generally. It is 
palpably evident in the dynamics of capitalism articulated by ENGELS (1935 [1872], 74), who 
observed that the bourgeoisie could find no better answer to the ‘housing question’ than to 
move the problem around, ‘in such a way that the solution continually reproduces the 
question anew.’ The correspondence between Engels’s account and LACAN’s (1979 [1953]) 
characterization of obsessional neurosis affords an opportunity to complete an unwritten 
chapter in the history of relations between psychoanalysis and historical materialism. That 
this possibility has been neglected arguably reflects the way in which Marx is drawn upon in 
DELEUZE and GUATTARI’s (1984 [1972]) denunciation of psychoanalysis, which they paint as 
failing to comprehend psychosis, remaining fixated on neurosis and its oedipal origins. Anti-
Oedipus diagnoses ‘the deficiencies of psychoanalysis as equally linked to its deep roots in 
capitalist society and its failure to grasp its own schizophrenic basis. Psychoanalysis is like 
capitalism: although it tends toward the limit of schizophrenia, it’s constantly evading this 
limit’ (20–21).3 Absorbing MARX’s (1973 [1858], 334) insight that ‘capital … is the endless 
and limitless drive to go beyond its limiting barrier,’ the implication is that schizoanalysis is 
not only primed to overcome the impasses blocking revolutionary desire (by superseding 
Freud’s dramaturgical account of the unconscious), but also better understands capitalism’s 
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constant striving to ‘tear down every spatial barrier,’ ‘conquer the whole earth for its market,’ 
and ‘annihilate this space with time’ (539).4 Yet the proximity of LACAN’s (1979 [1953]) own 
anti-oedipal account of obsessional neurosis to capitalism’s dynamics is striking. 
 
The impossibility of getting the stone in the right place similarly colours accounts of the 
colonization of the real by its double accompanying ‘attempts to make the real … coincide 
with … models of simulation,’ which BAUDRILLARD (1994, 2) paints as the contemporary 
form of ‘imperialism’ (an allusion to BORGES’s (1975 [1946]) tale of a once-great Empire, 
which constructed a 1:1 scale map of its entire territory). Insofar as obsessional neurosis is 
characterized by doubt, the etymological connection between ‘doubt’ (Zweifel) and ‘double’ 
(zwei) – registering the uncertainty introduced by a choice between alternatives – is evident in 
the revenge the double invariably exacts once it breaks free from its role as a dutiful copy, 
confined to the mirror (BORGES with GUERRERO 1974 [1967]). ‘Modern unreality no longer 
implies the imaginary,’ says BAUDRILLARD (1990, 29–30): ‘Hyperrealism … “gives you 
more,”’ but ‘by giving you a little too much … takes away everything.’ The real strikes back, 
in a manner perfectly encapsulated in Fredric Brown’s short short-story, Experiment; here 
paraphrased by ŽIŽEK (1989, 161–2): 
 
Professor Johnson has developed a small-scale experimental model of a time 
machine. Small articles placed on it can be sent into the past or the future. He first 
demonstrates to his two colleagues a five-minute time travel into the future, by 
setting the future-dial and placing a small brass cube on the machine’s platform. It 
instantly vanishes and reappears five minutes later. The next experiment, five 
minutes into the past, is a little trickier. Johnson explains that having set the past-
dial at five minutes, he will place the cube on the platform at exactly 3 o’clock. But 
since time is now running backward, it should vanish from his hand and appear on 
the platform at five minutes before 3 – that is, five minutes before he places it 
there. One of his colleagues asks the obvious question: “How can you place it 
there, then?” Johnson explains that at 3 o’clock the cube will vanish from the 
platform and appear in his hand, to be placed on the machine. This is exactly what 
happens. The second colleague wants to know what would happen if, after the cube 
has appeared on the platform (five minutes before being placed there), Johnson 




‘An interesting idea,’ Professor Johnson said. ‘I had not thought of it and it 
will be interesting to try. Very well, I shall not…’ 
There was no paradox at all. The cube remained. 
But the entire rest of the Universe, professors and all, vanished. 
 
Žižek furnishes this illustration with the apophthegm cited by Kant in Perpetual Peace 
(1795): Fiat justitia, pereat mundus! – Let justice be done, though the world perish! This 
maxim might equally apply to Leonard Shelby, the amnesiac protagonist of Christopher 
Nolan’s neo-noir revenger’s tragedy, Memento (or at least to his superego). Memento is 
characterized by temporal reversibility (half the film is presented in reverse-chronological 
order, conveying a semblance of Shelby’s inability to forge new, lasting memories). The 
resulting dislocation aligns with a world wracked by a self-destructive search for justice (the 
story chronicles Shelby’s mission to avenge his wife’s rape and murder in the face of his 
debilitating ‘severe anterograde memory dysfunction’).5 Just as Brown’s temporally 
disadjusted universe spontaneously vanquishes itself to another dimension, Shelby’s 
dissociated world is marked by a fatal attempt to restore an impossible equilibrium in the face 
of the obdurate and opaque qualities of the real. 
 
Recalling Lacan’s programmatic definition of the real as impossible, ZUPANČIČ (2001, n. p.) 
insists that ‘the whole point of the Lacanian concept of the Real is that the impossible 
happens:’ ‘the fact that “it happens (to us)” does not refute its basic “impossibility:” the Real 
happens to us (we encounter it) as impossible’ (ZUPANČIČ 2000, 235). Consequent attempts 
to reconcile the irreconcilable – and note that subjectivity itself is premised on an inescapable 
search for an unattainable goal – engenders a perpetual displacement, the nature of which 
forms the focus this chapter. It draws on LÉVI-STRAUSS’s (1963 [1958]) account of myth, as 
developed in LACAN’s (1979 [1953]) analysis of the Rat Man case-history, which borrows 
Lévi-Strauss’s proposal that neurosis constitutes an ‘individual myth,’ where ‘myth … is 
understood as responding to the inexplicable nature of the real’ (LACAN 1994, 67; in LEADER 
2003, 45). Examining this conception, the question of the ‘close link between capitalism and 
psychoanalysis on the one hand, and between revolutionary movements and schizoanalysis 
on the other’ proposed by DELEUZE (1995 [1990], 24) comes under scrutiny, obliquely 
broaching the opposition between psychoanalysis and schizoanalysis arguably defining the 




The map and the territory 
What psychoanalysis calls the resolution or dissolution of the Oedipus complex is a 
complete joke, it’s precisely the way an endless debt is inherited, the analysis never 
ends, Oedipus infects everyone, passed on from father to child. 
DELEUZE (1995 [1990], 17) 
 
We have here something quite different from the triangular relation considered to be the 
typical source of neurotic development. … [T]he element of the debt is placed on two 
levels at once, and it is precisely in the light of the impossibility of bringing these two 
levels together that the drama of the neurotic is played. 
LACAN (1979 [1953], 415) 
 
Freud considered that two traumas (and not one as it is so commonly said) are 
necessary in order to give birth to this individual myth in which a neurosis consists. 
LÉVI-STRAUSS (1963 [1958], 228) 
 
There is a striking resonance between the map that Shelby mounts on his motel-room wall, as 
a means of tracking down his wife’s alleged killer(s),6 and the map Freud appends to the Rat 
Man case-history, attempting to follow the convoluted logic his patient expounds in 
recounting a journey he felt compelled to undertake. Whilst the perpetual presence 
engendered by Shelby’s amnesia might suggest a schizophrenic reading of Memento, this 
cartographic resonance prompts an obsessional-neurotic reading. Anti-Oedipus sees neurosis 
as Freud’s Achilles heel. Yet it is salutary to note that LACAN (2007 [1970], 137) had already 
declared the Oedipus complex as ‘Freud’s dream,’ rejecting the oedipal origins of obsessional 
neurosis as early as the 1950s: the ‘whole oedipal schema needs to be re-examined,’ LACAN 
(1979 [1953], 422) pronounced. For Tomšič (2015, 178), ‘neurotic repression contains an 
assumption of castration and reveals in neurosis a particular protest against [a] structurally 
imposed perversion’ that relates to ‘the various traumatic effects of capitalism.’ Before 
engaging Memento to elaborate upon this, the entanglement of certain perspectives that serve 
to muddy the theoretical waters requires further attention. 
 
DELEUZE and GUATTARI (1984 [1972]) attacked a psychoanalysis they saw as complicit with 
capitalism and hence counterrevolutionary. Ridiculing the ‘analytic imperialism of the 
Oedipus complex,’ they accuse Freud of failing to grasp psychosis by insisting on the 
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schizophrenic’s ‘resistance to being oedipalized’ (25) – thereby allegedly missing the 
opportunity to see not only that ‘schizophrenia is the exterior limit of capitalism itself or the 
conclusion of its deepest tendency, but that capitalism only functions on condition that it 
inhibit this tendency, or that it push back or displace this limit, by substituting for it its own 
immanent relative limits, which it continually reproduces on a wider scale’ (246). Capitalism 
relentlessly ‘axiomatises with one hand what it decodes with the other’ (246); a point 
inadequately grasped in JAMESON’s (1983) equation of ‘schizophrenia’ with the experience of 
what was once quaintly termed postmodern culture: ‘the transformation of reality into 
images’ and ‘the fragmentation of “me” into a series of perpetual presents’ (28). Despite 
superficial resonances with Shelby’s entrapment in a perpetual present, Jameson’s faltering, 
would-be Lacanian account of schizophrenia is problematic. 
 
Jameson’s diagnosis of the ‘schizophrenic’ experience of temporal discontinuity and spatial 
disorientation characterizing late capitalism drew inspiration from LYNCH’s (1960) seminal 
account of non-alienating, ‘imageable’ urban environments: ‘the incapacity to map socially is 
as crippling to political experience as the analogous incapacity to map spatially is for urban 
experience’ (JAMESON 1988, 353). Yet prescribing ‘an aesthetic of cognitive mapping’ (353) 
as the remedy for a lost sense of collective direction embodies a nostalgic hope. Secreting the 
unacknowledged implication that maps are ‘extensions of Man,’ prostheses of mental maps 
hardwired into the brain (O’KEEFE and NADEL 1978) – a conception originating in TOLMAN’s 
(1948) experiments with lab rats navigating mazes, and long found wanting as a means of 
comprehending spatial cognition (BOYLE and ROBINSON 1979) – the appeal of Jameson’s 
metaphor belies the crisis of cartographic reason (OLSSON 2007; FARINELLI 2009). 
 
JAMESON (1988, 353) sees in cognitive maps – people’s perceived relation to their 
environment – ‘a spatial analogue of Althusser’s great formulation of ideology ... as “the 
Imaginary representation of the subject’s relationship to his or her Real conditions of 
existence.”’ Yet Jameson misquotes ALTHUSSER (1971, 153), who held that ‘Ideology 
represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence.’ The 
very relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence is imaginary, not (just) 
the representation of that relationship. Ideology is not a matter of false consciousness, of 
misleading representations distorting an underlying reality and our relationship to it. It is 
‘profoundly unconscious’ (ALTHUSSER 1969, 233). It works by forging the very terms 
through which (what passes for) reality is apprehended in the first place.
7
 When JAMESON 
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(1984, 83) characterizes the ‘latest mutation in space’ as ‘postmodern hyperspace,’ evoking 
Baudrillard’s hyperreality, he simultaneously jettisons Baudrillard’s insistence that ideology 
has no purchase in a world where ‘there is no division between things that mean and things 
that are meant’ (BAUMAN 1993, 36); where the distinctions between image and reality, map 
and territory, no longer hold. Insofar as the ‘hyperreal effaces the contradiction of the real 
and the imaginary’ (BAUDRILLARD 1993, 72), it implies neither the transformation of reality 
into image, nor image into reality, but their short-circuiting: ‘abstraction is no longer that of 
the map, the double, the mirror, or the concept. Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a 
referential being or substance. It is the generation by models of a real without origin or 
reality’ (BAUDRILLARD 1994, 1). 
 
By invoking BORGES’s (1975 [1946]) fable of a 1:1 scale map – once co-extensive with the 
entire territory of a great Empire; now an index of the Empire’s decline, the tattered remnants 
of the map’s fabric littering the Deserts of the West – Baudrillard offers a strategic reversal 
that serves as a poetic vehicle, mobilized to disarm any lingering faith in the rational kernel 
of the real. 
 
The territory no longer precedes the map, nor does it survive it. It is nevertheless the 
map that precedes the territory – precession of simulacra – that engenders the territory, 
and if one must return to the fable, today it is the territory whose shreds slowly rot 
across the extent of the map. It is the real, and not the map, whose vestiges persist here 
and there in the deserts that are no longer those of the Empire, but ours. The desert of 
the real itself. (BAUDRILLARD 1994, 1) 
 
Yet ‘even inverted,’ Baudrillard concedes, ‘Borges’s fable is unusable.’ It is ‘no longer a 
question of either maps or territories. Something has disappeared: the sovereign difference, 
between the one and the other, that constituted the charm of abstraction’ (2). In a world of 
simulation, ‘all things stand ultimately for nothing but themselves. … It is just by linguistic 
inertia that we still talk of signifiers, bereaved of signifieds, as signifiers; of signs which 
stand but for themselves, as “appearances”’ (BAUMAN 1993, 36). ‘Only the allegory of the 
Empire, perhaps, remains’ (BAUDRILLARD 1994, 2). This allegorical residue holds together 
Jameson’s appeal to cognitive mapping as well as HARVEY’s (1989, 240) account of a new 
experience of space–time, ushered in by ‘processes that so revolutionize the objective 
qualities of space and time that we are forced to alter … how we represent the world to 
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ourselves.’ Such accounts cling to a lost world in which the map and the territory remain 
distinct; where the conditions for maintaining a firm division between ‘things that mean’ and 
‘things that are meant’ remain intact. 
 
Memento offers an allegory of a world where such solidity has been liquidated; where ‘each 
such division is but momentary, protean, and ultimately reversible’ (BAUMAN 1993, 36); 
where the sovereign difference between the real and the imaginary, the map and the territory, 
has been dethroned. In the absence of the Other, we are nonetheless condemned to remain 
mapmakers and some maps serve better than others.
8
 Certain maps deliberately lead astray. 
Shelby’s map, like the Rat Man’s, ‘is a pointer to the nature of the problem itself: obsessional 
neurosis is nothing less than a map designed to mislead’ (LEADER 1993, 35). James and Alix 
Strachey, the editors of the English-language Standard Edition of Freud, felt compelled to 
redraw the map that Freud added to the Rat Man case-history, but ‘even the emendations of 
the Stracheys leave matters cloudy’ (MAHONEY 1986, 53). If we return to the earlier edition, 
‘What we find is a map in the form of a cross, as if it were parodying itself by crossing itself 
out, putting itself sous rature, like a repressed memory’ (TODD 1990, 14). 
 
Shelby’s wall-mounted map, annotated Polaroids, scribbled notes, and the principal clues to 
his wife’s killer(s) indelibly inscribed on his body, serve as prosthetic memories, ostensibly 
providing Shelby with sufficient means to orient himself and continue on his mission, 
unhindered by the memory disorder stemming from the trauma sustained at the hands of his 
wife’s killer(s). Yet Memento’s labyrinthine structure drip-feeds the audience with 
information that retroactively unseats Shelby’s account. Its incipient circularity paints 
Shelby’s substitute memories as the mythic dimension of his world, providing ‘a discursive 




‘I have done that,’ says my memory. ‘I cannot have done that,’ says my pride, and 
remains inexorable. Eventually – memory yields. 
NIETZSCHE (1966 [1886], 80) 
 
I have no desire to suffer twice, in reality and then in retrospect. 




[T]he amnesia brought on by repression is one of the liveliest forms of memory. 
LACAN (2006 [1966], 217) 
 
Without the central conceit of its non-linear narrative, Memento would amount to a run-of-
the-mill tale of violent revenge, set against an alienating backdrop of post-industrial urban 
decay, featuring the usual cast of noir characters: the hapless victim; the fatally flawed 
protagonist; the double-crossing cop; the duplicitous femme fatale. Yet if the story Memento 
recounts is straightforward (at least by Hollywood standards), its plot is (literally) anything 
but. The reverse-chronological sequence shaping the narrative sees the viewer constantly 
‘dropped into situations in medias res, which is, of course, the condition of Leonard’s life’ 
(CARROLL 2009, 136). Shelby cannot recall what has just happened and nor can the audience 
– although the audience has yet to witness the events about to unfold in the reverse-
chronological presentation. The viewer’s consequent ability to piece together the bigger 
picture entails that Memento delivers a false approximation of Shelby’s condition. If its 
spectators face an unfamiliar viewing experience, the film nonetheless reflects an experience 
far from uncommon outside of the cinema: ‘Life can only be understood backwards, but it 
must be lived forwards,’ in Kierkegaard’s celebrated aphorism.9 Kierkegaard’s disadjusted 
temporality resonates with the mechanism that Freud named as Nachträglichkeit, variously 
translated into English as ‘deferred’ or ‘delayed’ ‘action’ or ‘interpretation’ (or simply 
‘afterwardness’). At its most basic, the term captures the way in which memories are 
perpetually subject to retrospective revision; ever open to reinterpretation in the light of 
present experience – just as Shelby constantly amends the annotations on his Polaroids in the 
wake of more recent discoveries.
10
 Freud’s advancement lies in recognizing the retroactive 
function this performs, the resultant a posteriori influence cast by the present on the past. 
‘History is not the past. History is the past insofar as it is historicised in the present’ (LACAN 
1988 [1975], 12). It is to Lacan that an appreciation of the preeminence of Nachträglichkeit 
in Freud’s thought and its retroactive implications – the après-coup – must be credited.11 For 
LACAN (2006 [1966], 247), ‘What is realized in my history is neither the past definite as what 
was, since it is no more, nor even the perfect as what has been in what I am, but the future 
anterior as what I will have been, given what I am in the process of becoming.’ Tellingly, 
Shelby’s name evokes the simple future (‘shall be’). He is not, for instance, called 
Willoughby. As FINK (1997, 129) notes, ‘The obsessive lives posthumously, sacrificing 
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everything (all satisfaction in the here and now) for the sake of his name – having his name 
live on.’ 
  
For its audience, Memento’s retroactive temporality insistently undercuts the veracity of 
Shelby’s account of the violent attack, screened periodically in brief bursts of flashback, to 
which he and his wife were reputedly subjected. Particular doubt is cast by the uncanny echo 
of a parallel case from Shelby’s previous life as an insurance investigator. Again screened 
intermittently in flashback, the case of Sammy Jankis concerns the accidental death of 
another amnesiac’s wife, who, with inadequate proof to support a health-insurance claim, left 
her insulin injection in her husband’s hands to put the veracity of his memory loss to the 
ultimate test.
12
 Ostensibly an episode from Shelby’s past over which he retains a sense of 
guilt, the Jankis sub-plot recalls the retrogressive screen memories that FREUD (S.E. III) 
defined as the overwriting of the past by a fantasy construct that is nonetheless dependent on 
that past. In a description of Meyer’s The Monk’s Wedding that might retrospectively be 
ascribed to Memento, Freud suggests that the work ‘magnificently illustrates the process 
occurring in later years in the formation of fantasies – a new experience is projected in 
fantasy back into the past so that the new persons become aligned with the old ones, who 
become their prototypes. The mirror image of the present is seen in the fantasied past, which 
then prophetically becomes the present’ (letter to Fliess, 7th July, 1898; in MASSON 1985, 
320).  
 
Freud surmised that the purpose of fantasy is to fulfil an unconscious wish: fantasies express 
something unacceptable at the level of consciousness, which would be consciously denied 
and is consequently repressed – only to return in symptomatic form, delivering a satisfaction 
that disregards the subject’s conscious wishes. This conclusion was obtained in respect of 
Freud’s own dream of Irma’s injection: ‘its content was the fulfilment of a wish and its motive 
was a wish’ (S.E. IV, 118–19). By shifting the onus of his own failure to effect a cure onto 
another doctor, ‘Otto,’ Freud interpreted his dream as expressing a wish: it ‘acquitted me of 
the responsibility for Irma’s condition;’ and not only this, for where, on a previous occasion, 
‘Otto had … annoyed me by his remarks about Irma’s incomplete cure … the dream gave me 
my revenge by throwing the reproach back on to him.’ To be absolved of responsibility 
whilst being permitted to exact revenge precisely encapsulates the situation Shelby’s memory 
disorder sanctions. Moreover, the cases of Leonard Shelby and Sammy Jankis explicitly 




Suppose … that the dream-wish had as its content some illicit action in regard to a 
particular person. Then in the first dream the person will appear undisguised, but the 
action will be only timidly hinted at. The second dream will behave differently. The 
action will be named without disguise, but the person will either be made 
unrecognizable or replaced by someone indifferent.’ (S.E. XXII, 27)  
 
Memento’s parallel cases, like Hamlet’s play within a play,13 signal that the ‘truth is 
supported only by a half-saying’ (LACAN 2007 [1970], 110). The incongruous resonances of 
the excessive violence of rape and murder, and the excess insulin injections and fatal 
overdose – both involving penetrative acts, each representing perversions of life-affirming or 
life-preserving actions that result in death – confirm Lacan’s insistence that ‘half-saying is 
the internal law of every species of the enunciation of the truth, and what incarnates it best is 
myth’ (110). The truth lies neither in the accidental death of Sammy Jankis’s wife nor the 
violent attack on the Shelbys that motivates the desire for retribution. ‘It is not that the 
forbidden thought is simply disguised … but rather that it only exists … as the slippage 
between the one and the other’ (LEADER 2003, 44). Hence Nolan’s directorial commitment to 
rendering everything undecidable, nurturing the ‘indeterminacy of the viewer’s own memory 
of what definitively happened’ (CLARKE 2002, 176). Nothing is unequivocal, unambiguous, 
or indisputable; nor can the reliability of any character’s pronouncements be taken at face 
value – not even when the shadowy (ex-)cop, Teddy, elides Shelby’s and Sammy Jankis’s 
stories. 
 
    LEONARD 
  What the fuck are you talking about? 
 
    TEDDY 
       (theatrical shrug) 
I dunno... your wife surviving the assault... her not believing about your 
condition... the doubt tearing her up inside… the insulin – 
 
    LEONARD 
  That’s Sammy, not me! I told you about Sammy – 
 
    TEDDY 
Like you’ve told yourself. Over and over. Conditioning yourself to believe. 
‘Learning through repetition’ – 
 
    LEONARD 
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  Sammy let his wife kill herself! Sammy ended up in an institution – ! 
 
         […] 
 
    TEDDY 
  Sammy didn’t have a wife. 
 
Leonard freezes, staring at Teddy. 
 
  It was your wife who had diabetes. 
 
(NOLAN 2001, 218–19) 
 
 
Yet Teddy – John Edward (‘Teddy’) Gammell – is also a source of information on the alleged 
killer’s name: … ‘John G.’ If it becomes increasingly apparent that Teddy is manipulating 
Shelby, aiming to frame a drug dealer, Jimmy Grantz, in order to benefit from the proceeds of 
crime, this merely hints at the more disturbing implications of Shelby’s situation. Thus, one 
of Shelby’s tattoos qualifies the name ‘John G.’ with: ‘or James.’ Shelby’s amnesia means 
that he would be unable to recall avenging his wife’s murder, even if he had already got his 
man (or men). Within the brief 48 hours covered by the film’s reverse-chronological 
sequence, Shelby not only kills Jimmy Grantz. He also kills Teddy – in the opening scene, in 
fact, which forms the first segment of the reverse-chronological sequence. Shelby’s actions 
seem destined to repeat themselves interminably, as one conspicuous tattoo ambiguously 
confirming, ‘I’ve done it,’ implies – although all interpretations as to what this might mean 
are left in play. As intimations of Shelby’s culpability nonetheless insinuate their way into the 
viewer’s consciousness, Memento aligns itself with a series of neo-noir films, ‘such as Angel 
Heart or Blade Runner (the director’s cut), where it emerges at the end that the hero is 
himself the criminal he is looking for;’ where ‘the hero – the detective – is, without knowing 
it, implicated in the crimes he is investigating’ (ZUPANČIČ 2000, 246, 245).14 Yet whilst 
‘some have … seen in Oedipus the King the prototype of the noir genre’ (245), matters are 
arguably far more complex. 
 
Symbolic debt 
I take a walk in a town seen then for the first time. At every street corner I hesitate, 
uncertain where I am going. I am in doubt; and I mean by this that alternatives are 
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offered to my body, that my movement as a whole is discontinuous, that there is 
nothing in one attitude which foretells and prepares future attitudes. 
BERGSON (1911, 110) 
 
He who is to perform a horrendous act should imagine to himself that it is already 
done, should impose upon himself a future as irrevocable as the past. 
BORGES (1998 [1941], 121) 
 
[T]he obsessive neurotic always repeats the initial germ of his trauma. 
LACAN (1977 [1959], 17) 
 
‘You don’t want the truth, the truth is a fucking coward. So you make up your own truth,’ 
Teddy spits at Shelby in one particularly heated exchange. Adopting the perspective of 
trauma theory, THOMAS (2003, 201) proposes that Memento deals with the ‘difficulty of 
knowing and the need to know’ in the wake of memory loss. Such an approach has severe 
limitations. It fixates on demarcating historical reality and retrospective fantasy, overlooking 
such transversal possibilities as the material reality of the ‘enigmatic signifiers’ underlying 
the genesis of the unconscious (LAPLANCHE 1997; 1999) and missing the point that 
‘encounters with the real of the Other’s desire are always traumatic’ (LAPSLEY 2009, 329) or 
have the potential to be so. Such encounters precipitate what Lacan terms the fundamental 
fantasy. This conception, indispensable to understanding Shelby’s situation, may loosely be 
regarded as ‘constitutive of … psychical reality’ (FINK 2014, 47): the reality each subject 
fantasizes in attempting to negotiate its relation to the Other.
15
 Far from expressing a ‘need to 
know,’ Shelby’s position expresses a ‘knowledge that can’t tolerate one’s knowing that one 
knows’ (LACAN 1973–4; in FELDMAN 1989, 77); ‘something which is known unbeknownst to 
the ego’ (FINK 1997, 232n). The unconscious does not deal in recoupable knowledge, of the 
kind recorded in conscious memories or, in Shelby’s case, on scraps of paper, photos, maps 
or inked onto the skin. 
 
[I]n Freud’s work something quite different is at stake, which is a savoir certainly, but 
one that doesn’t involve the slightest connaissance, in that it is inscribed in a discourse 
of which the subject – who, like the messenger-slave of Antiquity, carries under his hair 
the codicil that condemns him to death – knows neither the meaning nor the text, nor in 
14 
 
what language [langue] it is written, nor even that it was tattooed on his shaven scalp 
while he was sleeping. (LACAN 2006 [1966], 680) 
 
For Lacan, ‘the unconscious is the Other’s discourse’ (459). A truth other than the one the 
subject intends will out. In a sense that will become apparent, ‘The tattoo … has the function 
of being for the Other, of situating the subject in it’ (LACAN 1978 [1973], 205–6); whilst the 
fundamental fantasy must be understood ‘in the most rigorous sense of the institution of a 
real that covers (over) the truth’ (LACAN 2006 [1966], 873). 
 
Shelby likes to imagine that his problems began at the point when violent intruders (two 
rather than one) put paid to the possibility of plenitude (absolute jouissance) imagined in the 
(impossible) ideal of domestic bliss: the vicious rape scene enacts the absence of sexual 
rapport in the most brutal form imaginable. An attack from the outside, however, renders as 
contingent what is in fact inevitable, on account of the symbolic castration marking the 
subject’s accession to language. The subject’s constitution in and on the terms of the Other 
necessarily divides it from itself, irrevocably alienating the subject from a vital part of its 
being. And ‘when one is made into two, there is no going back on it. It can never revert to 
making one again, not even a new one. The Aufhebung [sublation] is one of those sweet 
dreams of philosophy’ (LACAN 1982 [1972–3], 156). Although the real of the subject’s being 
is excluded from the symbolic, a trace of it nonetheless remains as objet a – the impossible 
object of desire that the subject is compelled to seek yet destined never to find; which is 
irretrievably lost on account of its being indefinitely deferred. ‘The object is by nature a 
refound object,’ says LACAN (1992 [1960], 118), casting the loss that permits the refinding as 
anterior to what is lost. Yet the subject’s inevitable failure to attain the lost object 
paradoxically yields a surplus jouissance: a plus-de jouir which ‘appears as the positive 
correlate of a subject who appears as a negative magnitude of the symbolic’ (ZUPANČIČ 2006, 
162) on account of its ‘unrepresented presence in the Real’ (ZUPANČIČ 2008, 167). The 
French plus-de jouir embodies a marked ambiguity: (no) more (than) jouissance. As 
ZUPANČIČ (2006, 156) avers, ‘the loss of the object, the loss of satisfaction, and the 
emergence of a surplus satisfaction or surplus enjoyment are situated, topologically speaking, 
in one and the same point: in the intervention of the signifier’ – primordially the unary 
signifier that first ‘represents the subject for another signifier’ (LACAN 1978 [1973], 218), 
assigning it its place in the Other. The unary signifier operates in the way that tally marks 
function as unary numerals in primitive counting systems: ‘The subject himself is marked off 
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by a single stroke,
16
 and first he marks himself as a tattoo, the first of the signifiers. When 
this signifier, this one, is established – the reckoning is one one’ (141). These two ones 
constitute the divided subject, which – like the Rat Man’s stone – is forever dislocated. 
Constantly displaced along the chain of signifiers in ceaseless pursuit of objet a, the subject, 
witnessing events in the rear-view mirror, ‘is there to rediscover where it was’ (45). 
 
The neurotic’s response to the predicament of subjectivity – personified in Shelby’s memory 
disorder and the irresoluble uncertainty it affords – takes refuge in the fantasy that absolute 
jouissance is merely forbidden (by paternal interdiction), not impossible (the consequence of 
symbolic castration). The Oedipus is ‘elaborated as a myth to allow the [subject] a 
positioning in the symbolic’ (LEADER 2003, 42). As ANDRÈS (1987, 61) puts it: ‘Castration is 
not the effect of the myth, rather the myth is an effect of castration’ (in LAPSLEY and 
WESTLAKE 1992, 44). Oedipus is the exemplary means by which the neurotic takes flight 
from the real of the Other’s desire, for fear of being eclipsed by it. ‘What the neurotic does 
not want, and what he strenuously refuses to do … is to sacrifice his castration to the Other’s 
jouissance, by allowing it to serve the Other’ (LACAN 2006 [1966], 700). Insofar as fantasy 
also expresses the Other’s desire, there can be no escape: only the forked path tracing the 
impossible relation between the barred subject and objet a: $ ◊ a. 
 
[In neurosis] we find fantasy’s two terms split apart, as it were: the first, in the case of 
the obsessive, inasmuch as he negates the Other’s desire, forming his fantasy in such a 
way as to accentuate the impossibility of the subject vanishing, the second, in the case 
of the hysteric, inasmuch as desire is sustained in fantasy only by the lack of 
satisfaction the hysteric brings desire by slipping away as its object. (LACAN 2006 
[1966], 698) 
 
Where the fantasized self-sufficiency of the (typically male) obsessive seeks to occlude the 
cause of desire in the Other whilst vigorously pursuing objet a, the (stereotypically female) 
hysteric constitutes herself as the object that is the cause of the Other’s desire, endlessly 
seeking to provoke it in order to confirm her existence.
17
 Both situations see the neurotic 
beset by doubt. For LACAN (1993 [1981], 174), echoing Heidegger, ‘the structure of a 
neurosis is essentially a question,’ varying only in its modulation and mode of address. The 
hysteric’s ‘Am I man or woman?’ is inflected in the obsessive’s questioning of the 




The hysterical manner of questioning, either … or…, contrasts with the obsessional’s 
response, negation, neither … nor…, neither male nor female. This negation comes 
about against a background of mortal experience and of hiding his being from the 
question, which is a way of remaining suspended from it. The obsessional is precisely 





Whilst superficially suggesting the ‘acting out’ of oedipal themes – ‘“love for the parent of 
the opposite sex” and “death wishes against the parent of the same sex”’ (FENICHEL 1990 
[1946], 91) – what is actually at stake ‘has nothing to do with reality’ (LACAN 2013 [2005], 
44) but with ‘the points at which the symbol constitutes human reality’ as a separate 
dimension, which ‘Freud constantly emphasizes when he says that the obsessive neurotic 
always lives in the register of what involves the elements of greatest uncertainty: how long 
one’s life will last, who one’s biological father is.’ As matters evading ‘perceptual proof,’ 
Lacan says, they are constructed by ‘symbolic relations that can then find confirmation in 
reality. … [B]efore we can know who he is with certainty, the name of the father creates the 
function of the father:’ the symbolic father. 
 
As in Shelby’s case, the guilt of surviving and living on in the place of another – a clinically 
well-documented aetiology – sees the obsessional neurotic confront the ‘unfillable gap 
constituted by the symbolic debt against which his neurosis is a protest’ (LACAN 2006 [1966], 
303). This, however, ultimately reflects the privation the obsessive suffers in the wake of ‘the 
mortification the signifier imposes on his life by numbering it’ (513): one one. The attendant 
evacuation of jouissance to the margins of the body’s erogenous zones engenders an 
overriding sensation of the body as dead, overwritten by the signifier, as Shelby’s tattoos 
serve to suggest. In LEADER’s (1993, 38–9) astute antimetabole: ‘a hysteric is a person to 
whom things happen whereas an obsessional is a thing to whom persons happen.’ 
 
In other words, he will do everything he can to avoid an encounter with the jouissance, 
the living dimension, of another subject. When he does encounter this, he tries to 
deploy the signifier to absorb all of the jouissance. The empirical result of this attempt 
at reduction to the signifier is mortification. We see this for example in verbal 
17 
 
obsessions: a subject’s whole life can be structured by some simple verbal command. 
(LEADER 1993, 39) 
 
The diagonal tattoo on Shelby’s chest – enjoining Shelby to ‘find him and kill him’ – 
redoubles this by literalizing it. Yet despite the obsessive ‘being caught up in the perpetual 
giddiness [vertige] of destroying the other, he can never do enough to ensure that the other 
continue to exist,’ since this preserves and perpetuates his own precarious existence (LACAN 
2015 [1991], 203). Shelby’s amnesia guarantees and determines that history shall be 
repeated: for the obsessive, once is never enough – nor, for Shelby, is one intruder, one 
suspect, one act of vengeance. Not even one motel room will suffice (the motel clerk rents 
him two). If Shelby’s affliction leaves him open to manipulation by others, in obeying the 
compulsion animating his phantom existence, he is perfectly happy to act at the expense of 
his own satisfaction, assuming ‘the transcendental function of ensuring the jouissance of the 
Other’ (LACAN 2006 [1966], 700). 
 
‘Castration means that jouissance must be refused in order to be attained on the inverse scale 
of the Law of desire,’ writes LACAN (2006 [1966], 700). By approaching neurosis ‘in 
possession of the thread that makes it possible to posit fantasy as the Other’s desire’ (698), it 
becomes possible to see that, in line with the prohibition issued in the Name-of-the-Father,
19
 
the Other enjoins to the subject to enjoy (‘Jouis!’) at any cost – echoing, in Sadean tones, the 
maxim cited by Kant: Fiat justitia, pereat mundus! In contrast with the neurotic’s 
interrogative, ‘the super-ego is an imperative’ (LACAN 1988 [1975], 102): not simply the 
ego’s moral conscience or censor, ‘the superego is at one and the same time the law and its 
destruction.’ Its functioning resembles Kafka’s (1996 [1919], 53) ‘peculiar apparatus,’ by 
means of which the condemned man has his crime fatally tattooed on his body: a corporeal 
pronouncement of his death sentence that is felt in the flesh. 
 
The super-ego has a relation to the law … a senseless law, going so far as to become a 
failure to recognise [méconnaissance] the law. That is always the way we see the super-
ego acting in the neurotic. … [T]he morality of the neurotic is a senseless, destructive, 
purely oppressive, almost always anti-legal morality. (LACAN 1988 [1975], 102) 
 
Shelby readily adopts an anti-legal morality, moving seamlessly from investigating life-
insurance claims to conducting fatal investigations that claim lives, mobilizing a sadistic 
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streak that responds to the superego’s categorical imperative. His conviction persists amidst 
the growing confusion wreaked as an obscene jouissance takes hold. Like BENJAMIN’s (1968 
[1940], 257) Angel of History – who, with his wings caught in the wind blowing from 
Paradise, is driven ‘irresistibly into the future, to which his back is turned, while the rubble-
heap before him grows sky-high’ –, Shelby’s doubts mount inexorably. ‘Compulsion turns 
into doubt, Zwang into Zweifel, as Freud first observed in the case of the Rat Man’ (MILLER 
1988, 37). 
 
Obsessional neurosis (Zwangsneurose) is ‘characterized by phenomenal evidence of Zwang, 
i.e. phenomena of constraint and compulsion manifested in the subject’s thoughts and acts’ 
(MILLER 1988, 34). ‘Compulsive acts,’ FREUD (S.E. X, 194) observed, invariably take place 
‘in two successive stages, of which the second neutralizes the first’ – as the Rat Man’s stone 
perfectly exemplifies. However much the obsessive rationalizes his actions, ‘their true 
significance lies in their being a representation of a conflict between two opposing impulses 
of approximately equal strength’ (typically love and hate). Such conflicts cannot be resolved 
via the hysteric’s mediation of contradictory desires: ‘what regularly occurs in hysteria is that 
a compromise is arrived at which enables both the opposing tendencies to find expression 
simultaneously – which kills two birds with one stone’ (194). It amounts to ‘a mode of 
expressing two in one’ (MILLER 1988, 37). In obsessional neurosis, however, ‘each of the two 
opposing tendencies finds satisfaction singly, first one and then the other, though naturally an 
attempt is made to establish some sort of logical connection (often in defiance of all logic)’ 
(FREUD S.E. X, 194). Obsessional neurosis involves ‘constraint without compromise’ 
(MILLER 1988, 37). Condemned to repeating his actions, ‘constantly suspended in the time of 
the Other’ (LACAN 1977 [1959], 12), Shelby remains trapped in the ‘labyrinths of the 
Zwangsneurose’ (LACAN 2006 [1966], 232), convinced that there must be a way out. 
 
Déjà vu 
One does not simply need the blueprints to a reconstructed labyrinth, nor even a pile of 
blueprints that have already been worked up. What is needed above all is the general 
combinatory that no doubt governs their variety, but that also, even more usefully, 
accounts for the illusions or, better, shifts in the labyrinth that take place right before 
one’s very eyes. 




LACAN’s (1979 [1953]) interpretation of obsessional neurosis centres on the Rat Man’s 
circuitous attempts to settle a debt at the behest of his commanding officer. The Rat Man 
feels compelled to follow the ‘Cruel Captain’s’ orders to the letter, despite the latter’s 
misidentification of the indebted party as ‘Lieutenant A’ (whose position at the military post-
office, which took delivery of the Rat Man’s spectacles on which payment is due, had been 
assumed by ‘Lieutenant B’). The Rat Man’s compulsion to square this circle – despite 
knowing full well to whom he owed money, and despite the fact that he could simply obey 
the spirit of the Cruel Captain’s order – remains undiminished by its impossibly contradictory 
nature. Whatever convoluted series of exchanges the Rat Man devises – Lieutenant A pays 
the postmistress, the postmistress pays Lieutenant B, he himself pays Lieutenant A (obeying 
orders), etc. – he inevitably leaves the original debt (in fact to the postmistress, as the Rat 
Man knew all along) intact. Lacan’s interpretation of this tortuous process alights on certain 
parallels – and subtle differences – between the relations situating the Rat Man and the 
constellation of terms constituting his father’s network of indebtedness (his decision to marry 
for money rather than for the love of a poor girl; an outstanding debt to a friend who paid off 
a socially embarrassing gambling debt). Echoing Freud’s earliest account of retrogressive 
screen memories, LACAN (1979 [1953], 412) advances understanding by characterizing the 
relations between the Rat Man’s and his father’s situations as ‘complementary in certain 
points and supplementary in others, parallel in one way and inverted in another.’ In 
DELEUZE’s (2004 [1972], 183) pithy summary, Lacan’s analysis proceeds ‘on the basis of a 
double series, paternal and filial, in which each put[s] into play four relational terms 
according to an order of places: debt/friend, rich woman/poor woman.’ Deleuze here gives 
due credit to a formula distinct from the tripartite, Oedipal one. Lacan’s phrasing directly, if 
implicitly, appeals to LÉVI-STRAUSS’s (1963 [1958], 228) canonical formula for myth: 
 
𝐹𝑥(𝑎) ∶ 𝐹𝑦(𝑏) ~ 𝐹𝑥(𝑏) ∶ 𝐹𝑎−1(𝑦)  
 
This formula expresses the reciphering of the terms of an irresolvable problem that transpose 
it onto new terrain in order to reach an imaginary resolution: ‘The inability to connect two 
kinds of relationship is overcome (or rather replaced) by the assertion that contradictory 
relationships are identical inasmuch as they are both self-contradictory in a similar way’ 




The Rat Man’s compulsions act out the reciphering of terms described in Lévi-Strauss’s 
formula, as, indeed, do Shelby’s, responding to the impossibility of bringing together two 
disjunct series: two generations of debt; two losses of life. As MANIGLIER (2012, 41) puts it, 
‘it is not an isolated event that can be traumatizing, but rather the kind of twisted relations 
that it bears with another event, which it echoes, not by repeating it as in a formal homology 
but by transforming it in a way which then makes it impossible for it not to be endlessly 
repeated.’ Obsessional neurosis effectively amounts to ‘a way of confronting an impossible 
situation by the successive articulation of all the forms of impossibility of the solution’ 
(LACAN 1994, 330, in LEADER 2003, 40). Insofar as neurosis amounts to an individual myth, 
nothing is ever resolved, only endlessly displaced, as the problem successively shifts gear, in 
an escalating series of escape attempts from a labyrinthine space. ‘Far from being separate 
from the others, each structure conceals an imbalance, which can only be corrected through 
recourse to some term borrowed from the adjacent structure’ (LÉVI-STRAUSS 1978 [1968], 
358), such that the ‘variant-producing cycle … takes on the appearance of a spiral’ (LÉVI-
STRAUSS 1981 [1971], 650). 
 
There are undoubtedly as many interpretations of Memento as there are permutations of the 
constellation of ideas it puts in play. The purpose of this chapter is not, however, simply to 
propose another reading. For when Engels described the bourgeoisie’s solution to the housing 
problem, in what retroactively appears as an anticipation of the understanding of obsessional 
neurosis crystallized in Lacan’s reading of the Rat Man case, he was far from describing an 
isolated nineteenth-century affair. In twenty-first-century global financial capitalism, the 
same basic mechanism has simply switched gears and dramatically altered the gearing ratio: 
‘When one limit is overcome accumulation often hits up against another somewhere else. … 
The crisis tendencies are not resolved but merely moved around’ (HARVEY 2010, 117). From 
the Rat Man’s stone to the global crises of contemporary capitalism, moving problems around 
provides its own mythic solution. Yet despite this striking parallel, Deleuze and Guattari’s 
emphasis on schizophrenia seemingly deliberately sidelined obsessional neurosis as a means 
of understanding capitalism’s dynamics. Ultimately, perhaps, this is as it should be – for it is 
not without irony that, in drawing attention to the structural similarities of obsessional 
neurosis and capitalism, the present chapter should itself exhibit the mythic structure 






Appendix – On Memento’s Structure 
To grasp Memento’s structure, it is useful to borrow narratology’s ‘distinction between a 
sequence of events and a discourse that orders and presents events’ (CULLER 1981, 189), 
respectively termed fabula and sjuzhet in the lexicon of the Russian formalists (the 
corresponding French terms, histoire and récit, whilst more intuitive, lose the resonance with 
‘subject’). The chronological sequence of events comprising a story (fabula) may always be 
considered independently of its discursive presentation or plot (sjuzhet). Memento’s chiastic 
sjuzhet comprises two alternating series of scenes: one, in colour, presented in reverse-
chronological order; another, in monochrome, presented chronologically (barring the 
occasional flashback). They intersect at a crucial juncture, where the colours of a developing 
Polaroid bleed almost imperceptibly into the surrounding scene. The reverse (colour) series 
imparts something of Shelby’s experience of amnesia, although the end of each colour scene 
incorporates a (lightly re-edited) overlap with the preceding colour scene in the presentation 
(sjuzhet), orientating viewers to successive developments in the story (fabula). 
 
Following KLEIN (2001) and KANIA (2009), it is conventional to number the black-and-white 
scenes sequentially, from 1–22; and to label the colour scenes in reverse, from Ω to A, thus: 
Ω, V, …, A. Scene A/22 is where the two series intersect (via the ‘contagious’ Polaroid). The 
opening scene, Ω, which includes a Polaroid ‘undeveloping,’ is the only one actually shown 
in reverse (the soundtrack is not played backwards and certain close-up sequences are, albeit 
undetectably, not reversed). Memento’s fabula may be reconstructed by reordering the 
sequence of scenes comprising the film (and has been, as a hidden feature on certain DVD 
releases). Given that the monochrome scenes all precede the colour segments within the 
diegetic chronology, the fabula may be rendered as 1, 2, …, 21, 22/A, B, …, Ω. The sjuzhet 
(narrative presentation), however, is ordered: Ω, 1, V, 2, U, 3, …, 20, C, 21, B, 22/A. If one 
imagines the fabula making a ‘hairpin’ turn back on itself at 22/A (Nolan, in MOTTRAM 2002, 
33), and the two series interleaving in the manner of a dovetail shuffle (indicated by the 
arrows in the figure below), the derivation of the sjuzhet becomes evident. The implication of 
the retrospective splicing of the two series at Ω is that the chiastic fabula may be made to 
form an infinite loop, suggesting the Möbius spiralling of external and psychical reality, and 
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Notes 
                                                          
1
Exchange at Cannes, 1962: Henri-Georges Clouzot, rather than Franju, is sometimes cited as 
Godard’s interlocutor. 
2Freud’s ‘Rat Man’ (Ernst Lanzer) obsessively engaged in elaborate forms of behaviour to 
ward off fears of a terrible fate supposedly awaiting his (already dead) father and his future 
wife. Freud attributed Lanzer’s condition to childhood sexual contact with his governess: a 
sense of guilt and fear of discovery by his father led to an association between sexual 
pleasure and punishment, displaced onto others as a defence. Lanzer’s commanding officer’s 
sadistic tales of ‘a specially horrible punishment used in the East’ involving rats (FREUD S.E. 
X, 166) precipitated or exacerbated Lanzer’s irrational fears. 
3
DELEUZE AND GUATTARI (1984 [1972]) define schizophrenia, not in clinical terms – as a 
psychiatric disorder – but in socio-historical terms – as the unhinging of meaning resonant 
with the fluidity of capitalism: the schizophrenic ‘scrambles all the codes’ (15), just as the 
delirium unleashed by capitalism sees all that is solid melt into air. This contrasts not only 
with the fixed beliefs of traditional societies but also with schizophrenia’s polar opposite 
under capitalism, paranoia, which remains preoccupied with authoritatively fixing meanings. 
LACAN’s (1993 [1981]) theorization of psychosis centres on the psychotic subject’s 
foreclosure of the paternal function: the schizophrenic is ‘the only subject not to defend 
himself against the real by means of the symbolic … because for him the symbolic is real’ 
(MILLER 2002 [1988], 9). Cf. DE WAELHENS (1978 [1972]). 
4
For DELEUZE and GUATTARI (1984 [1972], 25), the family psychodrama enshrined in 
Freud’s ‘tripartite formula – the Oedipal, neurotic one: daddy-mommy-me’ – sees the 
‘world-historical … crushed in the Oedipal treadmill’ (104), whereas ‘All delirium possesses 
a world-historical … content’ (97). This appeals to Marx’s remarks on capitalism’s 
inauguration of world-history – ‘World history has not always existed; history as world 
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history [is] a result,’ i.e. an effect (MARX 1973 [1858], 109) – and its ‘tendency to create the 
world market’ (408). 
5
The Appendix outlines Memento’s structure. 
6
In Memento, the fingerprints of the double are all over the scene of the crime. Ambiguity 
surrounds the number of intruders involved in the attack on the Shelbys: one or two – as 
Leonard insists, seemingly against the official police line. 
7
LYNCH’s (1960) work more readily calls to mind SARTRE’s (1958 [1943]) reworking of 
LEWIN’s (1938) hodological space (MIRVISH 1984). 
8
I am grateful to Rob Lapsley for stressing this more generous reading of Jameson.  
9‘It is quite true what philosophy tells us, that life must be understood backwards. But with 
this, one forgets the second proposition, that it must be lived forwards’ (KIERKEGAARD 
2001, 194 [1843, JJ: 167]). 
10
Freud maintained that later experiences, particularly of a sexual nature, may reactivate 
certain childhood memories, retrospectively endowing them with traumatic significance (the 
‘seduction theory’ of the aetiology of neuroses). In a letter to Fliess of 4th October, 1897, 
Freud acknowledged: ‘A harsh critic might say of all this that it was retrogressively 
fantasied instead of progressively determined [nach vorne]’ (in MASSON 1985, 270). Against 
Jung’s ‘retrospective fantasizing’ (Zurückphantasieren), however, Freud insisted that the 
past plays a determinate role in a present that necessarily recaptures something of that past – 
stressing that the reactivated memory, not the past event, induces trauma. Borrowing 
LAPLANCHE’s (2005) analogy, Nachträglichkeit accords to the model of a time-bomb: 
something is primed at an earlier stage, only to be activated later. Laplanche rejects Freud’s 
supposed abandonment of the seduction theory (LAPLANCHE and PONTALIS 1968 [1964]; 
LAPLANCHE 1989 [1987]). VERHAEGHE (1998) offers a compelling Lacanian account 
maintaining the same position. 
11‘The real implication of the nächtraglich … has been ignored, though it was there all the 
time and had only to be picked up’ (LACAN 1978 [1973], 216). Cf. DERRIDA (1978 [1967], 
203): ‘the concepts of Nachträglichkeit and Verspätung [delay/deferral] … govern the whole 
of Freud’s thought… The irreducibility of the ‘effect of deferral’ (à-retardement) – such, no 
doubt, is Freud’s discovery.’ 
12
A happy coincidence determines that the French for ‘unawareness’ is ‘l’insu.’ 
13
MALLIN (2010) explores the resonances between Memento and Hamlet. 
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14
In Nolan’s early short, Doodlebug (1997), a man attempting to swat an insect with his shoe 
eventually succeeds – only to discover that the insect is his doppelgänger in miniature. 
15
The formula for fantasy, $ ◊ a, posits an impossible relation between a barred subject 
(reliant on the Other, the subject can never be self-complete) and objet petit a (= l’autre; 
the object of desire arising from the separation of the subject from the Other). The subject’s 
negotiation of the cause of desire – its dependency on the Other – determines the form the 
fundamental fantasy takes. 
16
Lacan invokes FREUD’s (S.E. XVII, 64) suggestion that unconscious identification with 
another may adopt a ‘single trait’ (einziger Zug), such as a cough – implying a symbolic 
rather than an imaginary identification (which would involve wholesale imitation) – in 
situations where ‘identification has appeared instead of object-choice, and … object-choice 
has regressed to identification.’ Satisfaction derives from the unconsciously adopted trait 
rather than an invested object: ‘the investment is transferred to the unary trait that marks 
this loss’ (ZUPANČIČ 2006, 157). 
17
Taking Shelby for an hysteric, AITKEN (2009, 229) asks, perplexingly: ‘Is hysteria a 
psychosis or is it simply a condition?’ Hysteria is a neurosis, not a psychosis; and the 
‘either/or’ distinction is inapposite: the structural position occupied by the psychotic is 
distinct from a clinical psychosis, whilst ‘psychoanalytic research finds no fundamental but 
only quantitative distinction between normal and neurotic life’ (FREUD S.E. V, 373). 
18
Where Freud saw obsessional neurosis as a ‘dialect’ or ‘variant’ of hysteria, Lacan 
distinguishes distinct structural positions – eminently subject to what Freud terms 
Neurosenwahl (choice of neurosis). The hysteric’s question subverts earlier psychanalytic 
debate over male hysteria – originating in cases of ‘railway spine’ and, later, shellshock – 
and subsequently taken up in certain non-Lacanian feminist circles and film studies (KIRBY 
1988; KROKER and KROKER 1991; AITKEN and LUKINBEAL 1997, 1998; LUKINBEAL and 
AITKEN 1998). Some confusions on this score emanate from MULVEY’s (1975) account of 
the gaze as masculine, reducing woman to its object. For Lacan, the gaze belongs to the 
object, not the subject. It marks the blind spot in the subject’s field of vision, which, 
regardless of gender, the subject can never master – just as Holbein’s painting, The 
Ambassadors (1533), cannot be encompassed from a single vantage point: the memento 
mori, appearing in anamorphic perspective, frustrates viewing (as death frustrates worldly 
vanities). For Lacan, all subjects are subject to the Other’s gaze, which frames desire, 




                                                                                                                                                                                    
19
Nom-du-père and Non-du-père are homophonic. 
